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Abstract
In this paper we develop a theoretical model to clarify the underlying
mechanisms that drive individual decision making and responses to behav-
ioral interventions, such as nudges. The contribution of the paper is three-
fold: First, the model provides a theoretical framework that comprehensively
structures the individual decision-making process applicable to a wide range
of choice situations. Second, we reduce the confusion regarding what should
be called a nudge by offering a clear classification of behavioral interventions.
We distinguish among what we label as pure nudges, preference nudges, and
other behavioral interventions. Third, we identify the mechanisms behind
the effectiveness of behavioral interventions based on the structured decision-
making process. Hence, the model can be used to predict under which cir-
cumstances, and in which choice situations, a nudge is likely to be effective.
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1 Introduction
In 2017 Richard H. Thaler, who, together with Cass R. Sunstein, wrote the book
Nudge in 2008, was rewarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel. The prize boosted an already increasing interest in
nudges, and a search on “nudge” on Google Scholar shows a 50% increase in hits
during 2009-2017 as compared with 2000-2008, with the majority of the papers
having been published during the most recent years. The use of behavioral inter-
ventions, i.e. to alter people’s behavior without changing economic incentives, has
gained significant interest over time among both practitioners and academics. The
nudge literature has so far been mainly empirical, and very little theoretical work
has been conducted on the issue. One exception is Farhi and Gabaix (2018), who
analyze nudges in relation to optimal taxation. While their analysis has a norma-
tive focus, we develop a theoretical model to clarify the underlying mechanisms that
drive individual decision making and responses to behavioral interventions, such as
nudges. The contribution of the paper is threefold: First, we provide a theoretical
framework that comprehensively structures the individual decision-making process
applicable to a wide range of choice situations. Second, we offer a classification of
behavioral interventions based on the decision-making process, thereby reducing the
confusion regarding what should be considered a nudge and what should not. We
suggest a clear distinction among what we label as pure nudges, preference nudges,
and other behavioral interventions. Third, we identify the mechanisms behind the
effectiveness of behavioral interventions based on the structured decision-making
process. Hence, the model can be used to predict under which circumstances, and
in which choice situations, a nudge (or some other kind of behavioral intervention)
is likely to be effective. This is critical information both for policy makers who
are considering implementing a nudge and for researchers working on the design
and evaluation of behavioral interventions. There are also many normative con-
siderations when implementing nudges that have been discussed in the literature
on libertarian paternalism (Hausman and Welch, 2010). Even if our analysis is
purely positive and does not attempt to provide an answer to whether a nudge
should be implemented, the model may be used as a basis for normative discussions
since it clarifies important aspects of the decision-making process when a nudge is
implemented.
Going back to the work by Thaler and Sunstein, the following is perhaps the
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most widely recognized definition of a nudge:
A nudge ... is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without ... significantly changing their
economic incentives. (2008, 6)
While at first glance this seems to be a straightforward definition, the devil
is in the details, and it is crucial how “without ... significantly changing their
economic incentives” is interpreted for determining what constitutes a nudge. Just
like Hansen (2016), we classify behavioral interventions as nudges or not based on
the decision-making process, rather than the motive behind the intervention. In
our model, we make a distinction between attentive and inattentive choices, and
in our strict definition of nudges, we disqualify anything that affects the attentive
choice as a nudge. In the terminology of Kahneman (2003), System 1 and System
2 are two cognitive systems guiding individual decision making. They refer to
intuition and reasoning, respectively. Applying this in our model, we think of
individuals as making their choices in two steps. In the first step (which is likely to
be instantaneous), the individual chooses whether System 1 or System 2 should be
decisive when making the actual choice in the second step. If System 1 is decisive,
we refer to this as an inattentive choice, which is made according to some simplified
choice rule and not based on utility maximization. If System 2 is decisive, we instead
refer to this as an attentive choice where the individual acts as Homo economicus.
Homo economicus bases decisions on economic incentives only and is therefore,
by definition, not nudgeable. One important reason most people are different from
Homo economicus is that decision making and optimization are complicated, and
the outcome of a decision is often subject to uncertainty. Hence, making a well-
informed, utility-maximizing choice often comes at a cognitive cost. To reduce or
avoid this cost, individuals may use simplified choice rules such as basing decisions
on intuition or habit, choosing the first or last option on a list (Murphy et al.,
2006), choosing a pre-selected option, or even a random draw to determine the
choice. Salant (2011) shows that any choice rule used to process information that is
less complicated than utility maximization is subject to framing effects. We argue
that it is when we make this kind of inattentive or intuitive choice instead of acting
as Homo economicus that we are nudgeable. Or, as Thaler and Sunstein express it:
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... a nudge is any factor that significantly alters the behavior of Humans
although it would be ignored by Econs. (2008, 9)
Think of the case with organ donations. Making the choice whether to donate
one’s organs may give rise to emotions and existential questions that are uncom-
fortable to some. Therefore, one may might prefer to make no choice at all. In
such a case, the default option becomes crucial. Changing the default option from
no donation to donation has been shown to have a huge effect on the decision to
donate (see, e.g., Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2006; Li et al.,
2013).
Another, completely different decision is the one we make every day about what
to have for lunch. That decision rarely gives rise to the kind of dilemma connected
with organ donations, but one still may rationalize in order to reduce the cost
of decision making. One may, for example, always choose the first dish that is
listed on the menu. This choice rule also reduces the cognitive cost of making
the decision (although of another magnitude than in the organ donation case). In
a recent experiment, changing the order on the menu (from having a meat dish
on top to a vegetarian option first) turned out to increase the share of vegetarian
meals significantly (Kurz, 2017). When the nudge was removed, however, behavior
returned to the prenudge state.
To see how we reason about the two steps in the decision-making process, think
of choosing a snack when the available options are an apple and a candy bar. Ex
ante, before you are put in the choice situation, you may list preferential attributes
that are important to your choice of snack, such as price, nutrition and taste. When
you are about to make your choice, it is made in two steps. In the first step, you
decide whether to gather all information about price, nutrition, and taste or whether
you should simply pick one of the options—that is whether you should let System
2 make an informed and rational choice or whether System 1 should just make an
inattentive choice without any reasoning. If you go for the former, you will choose
the preferred option in the second step, but this requires you to exert some effort.
If you do not think it is worth the effort, you just pick one option without thought.
It is in this situation that you are nudgeable. If the apple is put at eye level and
the candy bar close to the floor, you may be nudged to choose the apple if you
just pick the option closest to you. This is what we refer to as a pure nudge. A
preference nudge, on the other hand could be a notice stating “The apple is better
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for you”. However, whether that counts as a nudge or not may differ across people.
If nutrition is an important attribute and you are not really aware of the relative
nutrition, you may learn something from the notice, which we would not consider
a nudge, but rather information. Information is not a nudge, as it would also affect
the attentive choice. If the notice (“The apple is better for you”) instead reminds
you of something you already know (it is healthier to eat an apple than a candy
bar), we classify it as a preference nudge. The nudge is not preference irrelevant as is
the pure nudge, but the choice is still made inattentively. Our model also indicates
when a nudge is likely to fail. If you have a strong habit of eating chocolate, you will
inattentively choose the chocolate disregarding where it is placed and what notices
may be displayed.
In Section 2, we present in detail how the first step in the decision-making
process is made, and in Section 3, we specifically study the inattentive choice and
the two kinds of nudges. We show that the effectiveness of nudges crucially hinges
on the importance and complexity of the choice, and how confident the decision
maker is in the particular choice situation. Our predictions are formulated in terms
of several claims, which are used in Section 4 to categorize various choice situations
and examine the policy implications and in Section 5 to systematically explore a
wide range of existing empirical nudge studies. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In standard utility theory, individuals are assumed to make an informed choice
resulting in the optimal outcome. However, there are numerous examples indicat-
ing that humans are not that rational but sometimes make choices without much
thought. We suggest a model where optimizing comes at a cognitive cost and the
decision consists of two steps (of which at least the first may be instantaneous):
first deciding whether it pays off to exert effort to make an informed (attentive)
choice, and second, making the choice based on the first step—that is, either an
attentive or an inattentive choice. The inattentive choice is based on some simple
choice rule rather than on optimization and may therefore lead to a mistake. This
is illustrated in Figure 1. Hence, there is a trade-off between the cost of making
an attentive choice and the consequences of a potential mistake from making an
inattentive one.
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Decision
Costly
Attentive
Risk of making mistake
Inattentive
Figure 1: Decision-making process
Consider an individual who should make the dichotomous choice between x
and y, but who does not have full information about all relevant attributes of
the two alternatives. Hence, the true utilities of the two goods are not known ex
ante. Making a rational choice—that is, actively optimizing—between x and y is
therefore assumed to require some cognitive effort ς. If effort is exerted, the relevant
attributes will become known, and the attentive choice will be based on which of
the certain utilities U(x) and U(y) is the greatest.1 Hence, total utility from the
attentive choice will ex post turn out to be
Uatt = max
{
U(x), U(y)
}− ς (1)
However, since the true utilities are not known without exerting effort, the
expected utility from the attentive choice net of the effort cost is ex ante
E[Uatt] = E[max
{
U(x);U(y)
}
]− ς. (2)
To determine whether it pays off to exert the effort, ς, the expected utility in
(2) is compared with the alternative, the expected utility of an inattentive choice,
which we denote E[Uin]. The inattentive choice is made according to some simplified
choice rule without exerting effort and may therefore result in a mistake. The
consequence of such mistake depends on the importance of the choice. θ is the
individual’s confidence about the likelihood of making the preferred choice without
1That ς is an information cost that eliminates uncertainty is, of course, a simplification. How-
ever, the reasoning is analogous if the effort is physical or emotional instead. In our model, we
assume that the individual makes a dichotomous choice and either exerts enough effort to enable
a fully informed choice as Homo economicus or does not exert any effort at all. This is consistent
with the notions of Reis (2006) but makes our approach a bit different from that of Gabaix (2014),
who lets the agent continuously choose the level of attention. However, qualitatively, our results
become very similar.
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optimization—that is, picking the option that ex post turns out to yield the highest
utility. Hence, ex ante
E[Uin] =θE[max
{
U(x), [U(y)
}
] + (1− θ)E[min{U(x), U(y)}]. (3)
The individual will make the choice inattentively iff E[Uin] > E[Uatt]—that is,
iff
ς > (1− θ) ∣∣E[U(x)]− E[U(y)]∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆E[U ]
. (4)
This implies that iff the cost of exerting effort exceeds the expected benefit of
making a rational attentive choice, the individual will instead make an inattentive
choice. Handel and Schwartzstein (2018) refer to this as frictions, where individ-
uals abstain from using information because it is too costly and instead make an
inattentive choice. Condition (4) can be divided into three components, which may
explain why different choice situations are more or less likely to be solved by op-
timization: (i) The higher the required effort, ς, the more likely the inattentive
choice is.2 The right-hand side of (4) captures the expected utility loss from follow-
ing some simplified choice rule rather than optimizing: (ii) 1 − θ is the subjective
probability of making a mistake in the inattentive choice. The lower it is, the more
likely is an inattentive choice. Someone who ex ante is confident in making the
right choice (high θ) without reasoning is thus less likely to exert effort to make an
attentive choice. (iii) If the choice is considered to be unimportant (the expected
utility consequence of making a mistake is small), the probability is also higher that
the choice will be inattentive. This is captured by the magnitude of the absolute
value of the difference in expected utilities, which we simply denote ∆E[U ].3
Hence, required effort in relation to confidence and importance determines whether
effort is exerted or not—that is, whether System 2 will be allowed to make an atten-
2Note that individuals may differ in their efficiency in their exerted effort.
3It can be noted that an unimportant choice in this context can refer to a choice between two
goods each corresponding to high utilities, which might seem counterintuitive. However, if the
difference in utilities between two such choices is close to zero, the cost of making a mistake is
still very low.
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tive choice or whether System 1 should make an inattentive one instead.4 Different
combinations of importance and confidence are illustrated in Figure 2.
Importance (∆E[U])
Confidence (θ)
D C
B A
Figure 2: Attentiveness in the importance and confidence space
The intensity of the color reflects the likelihood of making an inattentive choice.
According to (4), the product of unconfidence (1− θ) and importance (∆E[U ]) has
to be lower than the required effort, ς, for an inattentive choice to take place. In the
top-left corner of Figure 2, an unconfident individual makes an important choice,
which thus is the choice situation most likely to be made attentively. Only if ς is
very high, a choice categorized in D would be made inattentively. In the bottom-
right corner, A, we instead have the choices most likely to be made inattentively. If
the choice is considered unimportant by a confident individual, the choice will be
made inattentively also despite a very low cost of making the attentive choice. In
4In the terminology of Kahneman (2003), System 1 refers to intuitive decision making and
System 2 to rational reasoning.
7
between, we have B, where an unconfident decision maker makes an unimportant
choice, and C, where the decision maker is confident when making an important
choice.
A critical question is what determines the individual’s confidence about not
making a mistake in the inattentive choice, θ. Without any information about the
alternatives, a random draw between x and y could be made, and the probability of
the preferred outcome is θ = 0.5. Since the individual cannot have a prior belief that
is worse than random, it follows that θ ≥ 0.5. The more confident the individual is
about making the right choice also without optimization, the higher is θ. The actual
choice rule may be decisive for the value of θ. If it is due to habit, the individual
is probably confident about choosing the right option, and θ is close to one. If the
choice rule is to choose whatever a friend, parent, or authority chooses or decides,
the size of θ depends on how strong is the confidence that one has in that person.
Hence, although one has a very vague idea about U(x) and U(y), one could still be
very confident about picking the best option.
In Section 3, we explore the mechanisms behind inattentive choices in each of
the four categories in Figure 2 and determine the likely nudgeability in each specific
choice situation.
3 Inattentive choice and nudges
Assume that inequality (4) holds, and the choice is made inattentively. To under-
stand how this effortless choice is made, we join the strand of literature that makes
a distinction between actual experienced utility and what determines the decision
(commonly referred to as decision or choice utility) (see, e.g., Chetty, 2015; Gabaix,
2014; Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018). The inattentive choice between x and y is
thus based on choice utility V rather than on actual utility U . The inattentive deci-
sion maker will choose the alternative that yields the highest choice utility, V , which
consists of two parts: expected utility and preference-irrelevant attributes.5 Corre-
sponding with Step 1 of the decision-making process, we weigh the two parts of the
choice utility with a rescaling of the confidence parameter, ϑ(θ) : [0.5, 1]→ [0, 1]:
V (i) = ϑE2[U(i)] + (1− ϑ)µi, i = x, y (5)
5Preference-irrelevant attributes correspond to what others such as Bernheim and Rangel
(2009) and Chetty (2015) denote as ancillary conditions.
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where E2[U ] is the expected utility in the inattentive choice in Step 2, which may
be different from the ex ante expected utility, E[U ]. µ contains attributes that are
irrelevant for the choice in a neoclassical way–that is, they are irrelevant for the
experienced utility (such as placement on a shelf). Hence, the inattentive choice is
determined by the sign of the difference
V (x)− V (y) = ϑ(E2[U(x)]− E2[U(y)])+ (1− ϑ)(µx − µy), (6)
or, in short,
∆V = ϑ∆E2[U ] + (1− ϑ)∆µ. (7)
If V (x)−V (y) > 0, then x is chosen, and y is chosen if the inequality is reversed.
If V (x) = V (y), the choice is made by a random draw.
Although the choice between x and y is made inattentively, the choice is not
independent of preference-related attributes, ∆E2[U ], and the degree of confidence,
ϑ(θ). The individual may have some prior belief that one of the alternatives is the
best (a belief which may or may not be correct), and if ϑ = 1, this prior belief
completely determines the outcome of the inattentive choice. The other extreme is
that ϑ = 0, in which ∆E2[U ] has no effect at all, but the choice is completely based
on the preference-irrelevant attributes µ’s. Whenever ϑ ∈ (0, 1), both mechanisms
are at play to various degrees. We define a pure nudge as an alteration of µx or
µy, or both, and nothing else. For a pure nudge to have an effect, these attributes
therefore have to play a significant role in the inattentive decision. A preference
nudge is instead an alteration of the expected utility in the second step E2[U ], but
not of U itself.
Definition 1. A pure nudge is an alteration of a preference-irrelevant attribute in
an inattentive choice situation.
Definition 2. A preference nudge is an alteration of expected utility in an inatten-
tive choice situation, without altering actual utility.
A nudge thus means altering one of the two components in equation (7), without
altering actual utility or required effort—that is, without altering the attentive
choice. For the nudge to be effective, it must change the sign of ∆V in (7). We can
therefore identify two general claims:
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Claim 1. A nudge is more likely to be effective the less important the choice is
considered.
The less important the choice, the more likely it is to be made inattentively in the
first place. If the inattentive choice is unimportant (∆E2[U ] of a small magnitude),
the preference-irrelevant attributes have a stronger weight in the choice utility.
Hence, a pure nudge is more likely to be effective the less important the choice is.
However, also a preference nudge is more likely to work when the value of ∆E2[U ]
is small, because a smaller intervention is needed to reverse the sign. Moreover:
Claim 2. The lower the confidence, the more likely it is that a pure nudge is more
effective than a preference nudge.
In the inattentive choice, the relative effectiveness of a pure nudge versus a
preference nudge depends on the confidence, ϑ, of the decision maker. For a given
∆E2[U ], the less confident the decision maker is, the more likely it is that a pure
nudge is more effective than a preference nudge: At the limit, a preference nudge
cannot have any effect if ϑ = 0, and a pure nudge can have no effect if ϑ = 1.
Moreover, for a confident decision maker to be affected by a preference nudge, the
choice must be sufficiently unimportant, so that ∆E2[U ] is easily reversed.
Hence, we can now claim the following:
Claim 3. Making an inattentive choice is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for being nudgeable.
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Importance (∆E[U])
Confidence (θ)
D C
B A
Pure nudges most likely
to be effective
Preference nudges most
likely to be effective
Figure 3: Nudgeability and attentiveness in the importance and confidence space
In Figure 3, the intensity of the color still indicates the probability of an inatten-
tive choice rather than an attentive one, but here we have added a new dimension:
opacity, which illustrates the nudgeability. As can be noted, nudgeability coincides
with the degree of unimportance of the choice. Hence, the likelihood of a nudge
being effective is higher in areas A and B than in C and D. As noted above, a pure
nudge is more likely to be effective in B, while a preference nudge is more likely to
be effective in A. However, this does not imply that a nudge cannot also be effective
for choices in the upper part of Figure 3. Consider a choice situation in D for which
the required effort to make a rational choice is very high. Because of the high cost,
the choice is made inattentively and a nudge could actually be effective. The most
unlikely choice situations to be nudgeable are found in the upper-right corner (C).
A confident decision maker who is strongly convinced that one option is better than
the other will hardly alter behavior just due to a nudge.
Before going into the policy implications of our model, we also want to say a
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few words about what is not a nudge. We do not regard an intervention that affects
actual ex post utility or the cost of making an attentive choice as a nudge. Making
one option more easily accessible or providing information would thus not qualify
as a nudge. We would still call these behavioral interventions, though. Information
also could alter people’s choices when they are made attentively. It could either
reduce the effort cost, so that the choice is made attentively in the first place,
or make one change one’s opinion about the alternatives, so that the outcome of
the choice would be different. Information could thus alter behavior in both the
attentive and inattentive situations, while a preference nudge would have an effect
only on the inattentive choice. Of course, a specific intervention could be a nudge
to some individuals but not to others.
Further, we have not yet explicitly discussed the possibility of not making a
choice at all, which can be seen as the most effortless choice rule possible. Providing
a default option may therefore be a powerful tool. In our model, a default option
could work entirely through the µ’s and would then count as a pure nudge. If x is
the default option, then this would imply that µx > 0 or µy = 0. In fact, a default
option is nothing but the extreme of salience. However, in some circumstances a
default can be interpreted by the individual as guidance, suggesting that one option
is preferable. In such cases the default is a preference nudge, since it will have an
effect on ∆E2[U ] rather than on the µ’s. We discuss this in more detail in Section
4.
4 Policy implications for behavioral intervention
Going back to our schematic categorization and our discussions on nudgeability, we
now draw some policy implications for behavioral interventions in general. We start
by adding a number of choice situations to Figure 3. Although there are individual
differences in terms of both confidence and importance, the suggested positioning
should be viewed as illustrative examples.
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Importance (∆E[U])
Confidence (θ)
Buying a house
Going to the gym
Organ donation
Snack choice Lunch
Energy useDuplex paper printing
Cigarette disposal
Towel disposal
Climate compensation
Paying taxes
Mode of transportation
Pension saving
Figure 4: Examples of choices in the importance and confidence space
Choices in the lower part of Figure 4, which are choices that the decision maker
considers less important, are those where nudges are most likely to be effective.
Examples include towel reuse, duplex printing, snack choice, and what to have
for lunch. Commonly used pure nudges for those choices are default options and
framing (e.g., placing apples at eye level and candy bars closer to the floor or a
vegetarian option on top of the menu). Preference nudges, such as social-norm
messages of others’ behavior, are also common (e.g., information about how much
energy your neighbors use or a note in the shower indicating the share of hotel
guests who reuse their towels). However, as (7) shows, in a specific choice situation
(categorized as either A or B), pure and preference nudges both could affect the
choice of an individual.6 Returning to Figure 4, the choice of what to have for lunch
could possibly be affected by both types of nudges. Changing the order of dishes
6It is only in the two extreme cases where ϑ ∈ {0, 1} that only one of the nudges could be
effective.
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on the menu (a pure nudge) could affect the choice (Kurz, 2017), but we could also
think of a preference nudge that potentially could have an effect such as a sign
saying “Chef’s recommendation” or “Vegetarian food is good for the climate”. As
a comparison, we have placed climate compensation in the lower left corner, where
a pure nudge is more likely to have an effect than a preference nudge. A commonly
used nudge is a default to climate compensate when booking flight tickets (Aran˜a
and Leo´n, 2013). However, when trying to nudge individuals with a very high degree
of confidence, Lo¨fgren et al. (2012) found only little effect of a default option. Then
a preference nudge could have been effective instead. Both of these results are in
line with the claims of our model.
What about important choices? In the top-left corner of Figure 4, we could
place several choices that most often are made attentively, such as buying a house.
However, important choices made by unconfident decision makers are made inat-
tentively if the required effort to make an attentive choice is very high. Then even
important choices could be nudged. Think about organ donation, which is impor-
tant, but to the individual perhaps not one of the most important choices. As we
have discussed previously, the required effort of making an attentive choice may
be sufficiently high to prevent the individual from making the choice attentively.
A pure nudge, such as changing the default option, may then be effective if peo-
ple tend to adhere to a no-choice. However, providing completely new information
could of course affect the choice of the attentive decision maker. This would reduce
the required effort or even alter the actual utility of the options.7
Choices affected by habits can be placed in the top-right corner, where a confi-
dent decision-maker makes an important choice. The individual is convinced that
one option is better than the other and is also very confident that this is the pre-
ferred option. We claim that this situation is the hardest to affect by any behavioral
intervention. If one has a strong habit of driving to work it will be very difficult
to nudge such a person to commute by bus instead. For information to be effec-
tive, it would have to be very alarming to actually cause a change. Hence, if one
wants to affect choices influenced by habit formation, rather than using behavioral
interventions, a tax or even a ban could be necessary.
7Note that information also could have an effect in the inattentive choice via the same mecha-
nisms as a preference nudge.
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5 Interpreting the empirical nudge literature in
light of our model
In this section, we take a first look at the existing literature from the perspective
of our model to explore whether our claims and predictions are consistent with
what has been found empirically and experimentally. While it is beyond the scope
of this paper to make an extensive literature review, we have made an effort to
include at least a large share of the empirical nudge literature. The studies that
we reviewed are listed in Table 1. In the empirical literature, the term “nudge” is
used quite broadly and includes everything from framing and changes in default to
commitment devices and information. Clearly, our definitions of nudges are more
narrow. It is clear that many cognitive nudges, such as default and framing (which
includes increasing salience and visibility), would be pure nudges according to our
definition, and reminding people of social norms could be a preference nudge. It is
important to note that receiving information about what others do would count as
a nudge only if it would not affect utility in the attentive choice. If being informed
about a social or moral norm would affect an individual’s rational choice, then we
would consider it to be information instead, and not a nudge. In line with this,
our review includes nudges of social norm type but excludes studies that are clearly
informational or based on commitments, since such interventions are likely to alter
the attentive choice. We do include reminders, acknowledging that some reminders
may be information rather than nudges. For example, a general reminder from the
gym would count as a pure nudge, whereas a reminder that you should not forget
your booked spinning class would not. In the former case, the reminder may induce
an inattentive choice to actually go to the gym, whereas the choice of exercising has
already been made in the latter (although you may have forgotten it).
In Section 3, we identified what is decisive for whether a nudge is effective. Table
1 presents for each study whether the nudge had an effect; which category, A–D,
we think best describes the choice; and a judgement of required effort to make an
attentive choice. It should be noted that the categorization of the studies is clearly
subjective, and this should be seen only as a first (weak) test of our theory. If the
findings of the empirical and experimental literature show a pattern consistent with
our theory, this would arguably strengthen the model and encourage further studies
testing different aspects of it.
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Table 1: Summarizing nudge studies
Author Effect Type of case (A-D) Effort
Pure nudge: Default
Abadie and Gay (2006) YES D High
Aran˜a and Leo´n (2013) YES B High
Bronchetti et al. (2013) NO D High
Egebark and Ekstro¨m (2016) YES B Low
Johnson and Goldstein (2003) YES D High
Li et al. (2013) YES D High
Lo¨fgren et al. (2012) NO A/C Low
Pure nudge: Visibility/Framing
Altmann and Traxler (2014) YES B Medium
Blumenthal et al. (2001) NO B/D Medium
Fryer Jr et al. (2012) YES C Low
Gerber and Rogers (2009) YES A/B Medium
Goldzahl et al. (2018) NO D Medium
Guo et al. (2017) YES B Medium
Haynes et al. (2013) YES B/D Low
Hossain and List (2012) YES C Low
Karlan et al. (2012) NO B/D Low
Karlan et al. (2016) NO B/D Low
Kessler and Roth (2014) YES D High
Kurz (2017) YES A/B Medium
Sanders (2017) YES B Low
Schulz et al. (2018) YES B Low
Preference nudge: Social norm
Allcott (2011) YES A/B Medium
Alm et al. (2017) YES B/D Medium
Beshears et al. (2015) YES D High
Castro and Scartascini (2015) NO B/D Medium
Chen et al. (2010) YES B Low
Ferraro and Price (2013) YES A/B Medium
Goldstein et al. (2008) YES B Low
Goldzahl et al. (2018) NO D Medium
Hallsworth et al. (2017) YES B/D Medium
Holladay et al. (2016) YES B/D Medium
Sanders and Smith (2016) YES B/D Medium
Shang and Croson (2009) YES B Low
Sudarshan (2017) YES B Medium
Pure nudge / Preference nudge / Information: Reminders
Altmann and Traxler (2014) YES B Medium
Apesteguia et al. (2013) YES A/B Low
Ariel (2012) NO B/D Medium
Bott et al. (2017) YES B/D Medium
Cadena and Schoar (2011) YES D Medium
Calzolari and Nardotto (2016) YES A Medium
Castleman and Page (2015) YES D High
Chande et al. (2015) YES C Low
Dale and Strauss (2009) YES A/B Medium
Damgaard and Gravert (2018) YES B Low
Gerber and Green (2000) YES/NO A/B Medium
Guyton et al. (2017) YES B/D High
Habla and Muller (2018) YES A/B Medium
Haynes et al. (2013) YES B/D Low
Karlan et al. (2012) NO B/D Low
Karlan et al. (2016) NO B/D Low
Nickerson and Rogers (2010) YES/NO A/B Medium
Tørnblad et al. (2014) NO C High
A few things can be noted. First, very few studies concern choices categorized
as C (important and high confidence). The most commonly studied choice situation
seems to be B (unimportant and unconfident). This is what we would expect from
our model, given that researchers tend to study nudges in situations where they
ex ante are most likely to be effective. Perhaps surprising, we find many studies
characterized as D (important and unconfident), although in most of these studied
cases, we also judge the required effort to be sufficiently high for the decision to be
made inattentively, and therefore nudgeable.
Our theory suggests that nudges should be more effective in A/B situations
than in C/D. In line with this, we actually see that nudges in the studied A/B
situations seem to be effective. Moreover, most studies that do not find an effect
are categorized as either D or B/D situations. In most situations that we have
labeled as B/D, we judge that the importance of the choice varies significantly
among individuals, and it is therefore difficult to specifically label the choices. One
such example is tax compliance (e.g., Hallsworth et al., 2017), which for some
individuals may be very important while for others less so.
All in all, although our interpretation of the empirical literature to fit our model
is at best a crude illustration, it corroborates the mechanisms identified in our
model.
6 Conclusion
We have offered a framework that allows us to understand important mechanisms
of decision making. We think of decision making as a two-step process. In the first
step, one decides whether the decision should be attentively or inattentively made
in the second step. In the terminology of Kahneman (2003), the attentive choice
is made using System 2, where the reasoning and rational individual maximizes
utility, potentially due to some effort in terms of, e.g., a cognitive cost. An inat-
tentive choice is instead made using the intuitive System 1, whereby one uses some
simplified choice rule to avoid costly optimization. Making the attentive choice is
thus costly, but the outcome is the optimal one. The required cost is likely to vary
considerably across choices and across individuals. How important it is to reach the
optimal outcome may also vary. If the cost is high or the choice is unimportant,
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it is very likely that it will not pay off to exert the effort, and one will make an
inattentive choice instead. The confidence of the individual may also be decisive.
The kind of confidence we regard is the ex ante confidence that the outcome of an
inattentive choice would be the preferred one. Hence, a choice rule built on habit or
mimicking the choice of a trustworthy person could make the individual confident
that attentive optimization is not needed for the optimal option to be chosen.
If one decides to make the attentive choice, one is by definition not susceptible
to nudging. One could, however, be affected by other behavioral interventions, such
as information. This could reduce the required effort to make the attentive choice,
or new information could affect the choice itself in the second step.
If the choice is instead inattentively made, one may be susceptible to the two
distinct kinds of nudges that we define in the paper. We think of an inattentive
choice as based on choice utility, which is likely to differ from actual utility. Choice
utility is based on two parts, both expected utility of the choice alternatives and
attributes that are totally irrelevant in terms of preferences. Altering any of these
preference-irrelevant attributes is what we define as a pure nudge. Examples of pure
nudges are changing default options, altering menu order, and reducing the plate
size. Preference nudges are defined as altering the expected utility in the inattentive
choice without altering actual utility. This may require some explanation. Actual
utility is based on certain attributes, and those are the ones that determine the
outcome in the attentive choice. A preference nudge makes one of the options
appear better or worse for the inattentive decision maker without affecting any
of these attributes. Examples of preference nudges are alerting taxpayers that a
majority pay their taxes on time and reminding hotel guests that reusing towels is
good for the environment.
The line between preference nudges and information may be fine, though. Both
knowledge and what attributes are decisive for attentive optimization vary across
individuals. Hence, something that is a nudge for one person may well count as
information for another.
In addition to offering clear definitions of nudges, we have discussed in what
choice situations different behavioral interventions are more or less likely to be
effective. In a choice situation that is unimportant and where the individual is un-
confident, a pure nudge is most likely to have an effect. If the individual is confident
when making the unimportant choice, a preference nudge would presumably have
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a stronger effect. Important choices made by unconfident individuals are the most
likely to be made attentively. Then information would be more likely to affect the
decision. Only if a high degree of effort is needed to make an attentive choice do
unconfident individuals make important choices inattentively, and thereby become
nudgeable. For important decisions made by confident individuals, such as those
due to habit formation, neither information, nor nudges are likely to be effective.
This may explain why travel habits are so hard to affect by behavioral interventions.
When categorizing a large number of empirical nudge studies, we see that they
corroborate our theory to a large extent. Very few studies deal with the kinds of
choice situations that we claim to be the least nudgeable. Nudges are, however,
found to alter behavior in situations that we claim to be nudgeable. Hence, the
model we propose and its predictions may guide those who want to alter people’s
behavior using behavioral interventions.
Our positive analysis can also be used as an input to the normative discussion
on nudging. For example, assume that we know that a choice could be effectively
nudged based on our model. This does not necessarily mean that a nudge should
be implemented. A nudge only works when the choice is made inattentively and for
some decisions, perhaps the mere fact that the choice is made attentively is more
valuable than the outcome of the choice. For instance, in cases where decisions
involve ethical and moral considerations. The welfare implications in such choice
situations should be thoroughly analysed before implementing a nudge.
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